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ESSAY
PROTECTION OF THE ATHLETE'S
IDENTITY: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY,
ENDORSEMENTS AND DOMAIN NAMES*
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY&
PAUL M. ANDERSON"~
The history and growth of the right of publicity is intimately inter-
twined with sports. The history of the right of publicity was largely devel-
oped by the desire of advertisers to attract attention to their goods and
services by using the identity of prominent athletes - without paying for
that value. This essay will focus on three areas. First, it will discuss the
state of the law today as to the right of publicity, focusing especially on
the sports dimension. Next, the related area of false endorsement under
federal law will be examined. Finally, the new federal and California
laws on cybersquatting of personal names will be described.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. The O'Brien Case: 1941
The key decision that set the stage for the creation of the right of
publicity is the Fifth Circuit's 1941 O'Brien case.' David O'Brien was a
famous football player in the 1930s who had played for Texas Christian
University (TCU) and then as a professional for the Philadelphia Eagles.
O'Brien sued the Pabst Brewing Company, specifically, Pabst Sales Co.,
* Originally presented on January 5, 2001, as part of the Marketing and Legal Protection
of an Athlete's Identity symposium, co-sponsored by the American Association of Law Schools
Sections on Law and Sports and Intellectual Property.
** Professor of Law, University of San Francisco and consultant "of counsel" to Morrison
and Foerster, San Francisco, CA. Author of THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY and
MCCARTHY ON TRADRmAKS AND UNFAIR COMPEITON.
*** Supervisor for the MARQUETrE SPORTS LAW Rnvrnw, and the Assistant Director of
the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School where he is an Adjunct
Assistant Professor. Professor Anderson provided assistance in the conversion of this presen-
tation into article form.
1. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales, Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
for using his photo on Pabst's 1939 beer advertising calendar. 2 O'Brien
was upset because he was active in a group urging teens not to drink and
he had refused opportunities to endorse beer.
Interpreting Texas law, the Fifth Circuit threw out O'Brien's case,
reasoning that he was not a private person and could not be harmed by
more publicity.3 The court adopted the view that if O'Brien did not -
and could not -object to the publicity he received in the sports pages, he
would not be allowed to object to the publicity he got on advertising for
Pabst beer.4 The court caught O'Brien in a catch 22: his refusal to volun-
tarily endorse beer was a waiver of his right to recover in court the rea-
sonable value of his identity used to endorse the sale of beer. The court
could not bring itself to view O'Brien's claim as an assertion of a right to
stop the unpermitted use of his identity to sell a brand of beer, whether
he loved beer or hated it. However, the dissent said the time was ripe to
recognize a legal claim for the uncompensated use of the identity of a
professional athlete to help sell a product.5
B. The Haelan Case: 1953
The O'Brien case set the stage for the famous 1953 Haelan decision,
widely haled as the case that coined the term "right of publicity."'6
Forty-eight years ago in February 1953, in the seminal Haelan baseball
trading card case, Judge Jerome Frank, writing the opinion for the Sec-
ond Circuit, held that under the law of the state of New York there was
something called a "right of publicity" that was separate and apart from
the right of privacy.7
In Haelan, the parties were rival chewing gum makers who were bat-
tling to obtain the rights from major league baseball players to use their
pictures on trading cards. Plaintiff said that defendant had induced play-
ers who had signed exclusive deals with plaintiff to sign a license with
defendant. In addition, in some cases, the defendant used players' pic-
tures without asking them at all. Defendant argued that plaintiff had no
right to assert, for all that the players' contracts consisted of was a mere
waiver of the right to sue for an invasion of privacy.' The waiver, defen-
dant argued, was only a personal and non-assignable waiver of the right
2. Id.
3. Id. at 169-70.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 170.
6. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
7. Id. at 868-69.
8. Id. at 867.
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to sue for an invasion of hurt feeling by commercial use of his identity on
trading cards.9 As the mere holder of a non-assignable waiver, plaintiff
could not sue its competitor-defendant.
In rejecting this argument, Judge Frank first created a new kind of
property right under a new label. 10 Judge Frank did this to break the
logjam of confusion over the meaning of the term "privacy." He wanted
to avoid the kind of privacy thinking that dominated the O'Brien case.
Judge Frank recognized for the first time a property right in identity that
can be legally separated from the person in a way that privacy rights
cannot."
After the 1953 Haelan decision, the rest is history. Moreover, much
of this history of the right of publicity is a series of battles over the un-
compensated use of the identity of athletes to sell products and services.
C. What Is The Right Of Publicity?
The question then becomes, at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury, what is this thing called the right of publicity? What has the law
come to in the last forty-eight years since Haelan?
The answer is quite simple. There is nothing abstruse or complicated
about it. The right of publicity is simply the right of every person to
control the commercial use of his or her identity.'2 This means that it is
illegal under the right of publicity to use, without a license, the identity
of a real person to attract attention to an advertisement. 3 You can love
it or you can hate it. You can embrace it or you can bitterly criticize it.
You can argue its fine points or you can attack its very foundations. But
that is what it is. The right of publicity is the right of every person to
control the commercial use of his or her identity. At least both support-
ers and critics can agree on what it is we are talking about when we
argue about the legitimacy and dimensions of the right of publicity.
D. Free Speech Limits
It must also be clear what the right of publicity can do and what it
cannot do. The right can give every person the right to either prevent or
9. Id.
10. Id. at 868.
11. Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868.
12. J. THoMAs McCARY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2000).
13. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Pub-
licity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 129, 130 (1995).
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permit, for a fee, the use of his or her identity in an advertisement to
help sell someone's product.' 4
The right of publicity cannot be used to prevent someone's name or
picture in news reporting.15 It cannot be used to prevent use of identity
in an unauthorized biography. 6 In addition, it cannot prevent use of
identity in an entertainment parody or satire, such as that of imitator
Rich Little and satirical programs such as Saturday Night Live.17
For example, an athlete like San Francisco 49er football star receiver
Jerry Rice cannot use the right of publicity to prevent the use of his
name and picture in a story in Sports Illustrated, and he cannot use it to
prevent a sports writer in the San Francisco Chronicle from criticizing
him. Jerry Rice can use the right of publicity either to prevent or to
license for a fee the use of his name to help sell Nike sports equipment.
However, he cannot use the right of publicity to stop a writer from doing
a biography of his life in print or a partially fictionalized story of his life
on a television special. Jerry Rice cannot use the right of publicity to
stop the National Enquirer from writing an "in depth" expose of his life.
Some people have criticized the right of publicity as posing the dan-
ger of invading our free speech rights. In fact, for all practical purposes,
the only kind of speech impacted by the right of publicity is commercial
speech - advertising - not news, not stories, not entertainment and not
entertainment satire and parody - only advertising and other purely com-
mercial uses.'8
The right of publicity' is not a kind of trademark. It is not just a spe-
cies of copyright. And it is not merely another kind of privacy right. It is
none of these things, although it bears some family resemblance to all
three. The right of publicity is a wholly different and separate legal
right.
14. Laura Lee Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Professional Athlete's Right Of Public-
ity, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 23, 25 (1999).
15. McCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 8:46.
16. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.2d 432,439 (5th Cir. 1994) (The publication of an unau-
thorized book about events in the plaintiff's life was not an infringement of plaintiff's rights of
either publicity or privacy. Most of the facts were public and apart from the fictionalization,
the basic facts in defendant's book were true. The court found that defendant's book and
possible movie version would not damage plaintiff's own factual book about the same story).
See also Ruffin-Steinback v. De Passe, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (Deceased
and living former members of the 1960's singing group "The Temptations" could not use the
right of publicity to recover damages from the producer of a television docudrama for present-
ing a partially fictionalized story of the singing group).
17. McCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 8:11.
18. Id. at § 1:3.
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E. The State Of The Law: 2001
The state of the law in the United States is surprisingly clear:
1. Living persons: as of 2001, under either common law or stat-
ute, the right of publicity of living persons has been recognized
as the law in twenty-eight states.1 9 Of these twenty-eight
states, eighteen have statutory provisions and the right of pub-
licity is recognized solely by common law in the other ten
states.
2. Deceased persons: under either common law or statute, a post
mortem right of publicity has been recognized as the law in
seventeen states.20
The newest right of publicity statutes are those in Illinois and Ohio,
which were enacted in 1999.21 Both of these statutes create a right of
publicity for living persons, as well as post mortem rights, lasting for fifty
years after death in Illinois, and sixty years in Ohio.a2
There is no post mortem right of publicity under the law of New
York.' Thus, if the late Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis died a resident of
the state of New York, New York law might well apply and, therefore,
her estate would have no right of publicity to assert against the Franklin
Mint's use of her name and picture to sell faux pearls.
Keep in mind that advertisers who want to run a particular advertise-
ment nationally must comply with the law of all fifty states, not just the
law of the state in which the corporate headquarters is located. To run an
advertisement nationally, the advertiser must comply with the right of
publicity law of the state with the tightest restrictions.
F. Identity Values And Performance Values
I divide all right of publicity cases into two categories: the use of a
person's identity for its identification value or use of a person's perform-
ance for its performance value. 4 By far the most common situation is
19. Id. at § 6:3.
20. Id. at § 9:18.
21. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 1075/1-1075/60 (2000); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2741.01-.09
(2000).
22. 765 ILL. Comp. STAT. § 1075/30; Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2741.02.
23. McCarthy, supra note 13, at 132. See also Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586
(2d Cir. 1990) (Photos of the late baseball all-time great Babe Ruth in a baseball oriented
engagement calendar did not infringe either trademark rights or the New York right of
publicity).
24. McCarthy, supra note 13, at 133.
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the use of persona for identification values.' That is, use in advertising
or on products to draw attention to the ad.
Cases dealing with performance value are rare. An example of this
type of case would be trying to put on a live performance to make the
audience think it is 1975 by including an Elvis Presley look-alike per-
former who puts on a show just like Elvis would have done in 1975.26
The famous 1977 Zacchini case also fits in the "performance value" cate-
gory.2 7 These kinds of cases are "performance value" cases; they do not
focus on the use of identity in an ad to help sell a product. 8 They are
rare and not typical at all of the run-of-the-mill right of publicity dispute.
What the right of publicity is about ninety-eight percent of the time is
the use of some aspect of a person to help sell a product - like drawing
attention to an advertisement.
G. Who Does the Right of Publicity Protect?
The right of publicity protects everyone - both celebrities and non-
celebrities. Still, most of the case law concerns celebrities because usu-
ally, only a celebrity's right of publicity is worth enough to justify expen-
sive litigation and appeals.29 The right of publicity does not protect the
"persona" of a corporation, partnership or an institution - only of a real
human being." So it makes no sense to talk about the right of publicity
of Microsoft or Toyota - there is no such thing.
H. Identifiability: The Test of Infringement
How does one trespass on the right of publicity? The question here
is one of identification. The test of infringement is "identifiability;" it
does not focus on confusion as to endorsement by the person.3 '
I think that the issue is one of "unaided identification. '3 2 In other
words, can more than a de minimis number of ordinary viewers looking
at (or listening to) the defendant's advertisement identify the plaintiff?
In the 1998 Don Newcombe case, the Ninth Circuit reversed sum-
mary judgement dismissal of former all-star baseball pitcher Don New-
25. Id.
26. Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
27. Zachinni v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
28. McCarthy, supra note 13, at 133.
29. Id. at 134.
30. McCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 4:40. See, e.g., Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d
386 (Mo. Ct. App 1998) (a corporation does not have a right of publicity).
31. McCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 3:17.
32. Id. at § 3:19.
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combe's right of publicity claim against Coors.33 In a Killian's Beer ad in
Sports Illustrated magazine, Coors used a drawing of a baseball pitcher in
a stance that Newcombe alleged was easily identifiable as him. With
echoes of the O'Brien case a half century before, Newcombe was partic-
ularly upset at the beer ad because he was a recovering alcoholic who
was a prominent spokesman warning against the dangers of alcohol.
Coors admitted that the drawing of the pitcher in its ad was in fact
"based on" a photo of Newcombe pitching in the 1949 World Series.
34
The court observed that the Coors drawing and the photo of Newcombe
were "virtually identical" except that the uniform number was changed
from "36" to "39. 3 5
The court applied the California Civ. Code § 3344(b) test of photos
to this drawing.3 6 Under this test, the person must be "readily identifi-
able," meaning that a viewer can reasonably determine that the person
depicted in the photograph is the same person "as the plaintiff."'37 The
court held that there was an issue of fact for trial as to whether New-
combe's pitching stance was so distinctive that he was identifiable from
the drawing in the Coors beer advertisement.38
The link with the plaintiff to constitute infringement of the right of
publicity need not rise to the level that would support a claim for false
endorsement. The 1995 Restatement also follows this and the case law in
demonstrating that deception or false endorsement is not required to
prove a case of infringement of the right of publicity.
39
Identity can be stolen and used to attract attention to an advertise-
ment or product without giving rise to a valid claim of false endorse-
ment. The identity of a famous person is used to cut through the clutter
of advertising and to merely draw attention to the advertisement.
Two hypothetical examples can be imagined: "Clint Eastwood has
knocked off lots of bad guys, but he's never tasted Sigmund beer," or
"Jerry Rice and Aikon cell phones - both top receivers in their field."
33. Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998).
34. Id. at 689.
35. Id.
36. CAL. CrV. CODE § 3344(b) (2000). See McCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 6:28.
37. Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 692.
38. Id. at 696.
39. RESTATEMENT (TmnD) OF UNFAm COMpETrnON § 46 Cmt. b (1995) ("Proof of de-
ception or consumer confusion is not needed for the imposition of liability under this Sec-
tion."); Id. at § 47, Cmt. a ("Proof that prospective purchasers are likely to believe that the
identified person endorses or sponsors the user's goods or services is not required for the
imposition of liability."). See cases cited at McCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 5:19.
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There is no false endorsement here, but the hypothetical companies are
clearly using identity to help sell a product.
II. FREE SPEECH
A. Commercial Versus Communicative Uses
The right of publicity issue that arises most often, and is the most
difficult issue to give clear advice to a client, is the free speech issue. My
suggestion is that lawyers follow the two categories summarized in the
rule of thumb contained in the box in the following outline:
"Commercial Use" ..................................... infringement
"Communicative Use" .............................. Immune as fully
protected free speech
Definitions: A "communicative" use is one in which the policy of free
speech predominates over the right of a person to his identity, and no
infringement of the right of publicity takes place.4" A "commercial" use
is one in which the right of publicity is infringed because, while there are
overtones of ideas being communicated, the use is primarily
commercial.41
The medium used will often determine the result. For example, the
unpermitted use of a person's identity on a product such as a coffee mug
or a T-shirt will usually be dubbed "commercial" and require a license.42
However, the unpermitted use of a person's identity and picture to illus-
trate a story in a newspaper, magazine or television news program will
be "communicative" and immune.43 Telling the client which category the
challenged use will fall into is sometimes easy, sometimes very difficult.
B. The Lew Alcindor Case
An illustrative and not atypical case is the Lew Alcindor as Abdul-
Jabbar case.44 General Motors ran a television advertisement for Olds-
mobile cars. This ad ran during the NCAA men's basketball tourna-
ment. The voice-over asked: "Who holds the record for being voted the
most outstanding player of this tournament?" On screen appeared the
40. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETIION
§ 28:41, at 28-50 (rev. 2001).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 7:20.
44. Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996).
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answer: "Lew Alcindor, UCLA, '67, '68, '69." Once having attracted the
viewer's attention, the advertisement proceeded to laud Oldsmobile, us-
ing sports metaphors that echoed Alcindor's accomplishment.
The court rejected the advertiser's defense that its use of Alcindor's
name was only "incidental" to conveying newsworthy sports informa-
tion.a" The court pointed out that this was not a usage in a sports or
news account, instead it was in the context of an advertisement for an
automobile.46 That is, the distinction the court drew was between con-
veying information in traditional media on the one hand (free speech
protected) and conveying the same information in an advertisement for
a commercial product on the other hand (infringement).
C. The 1969 Mets Case
Similarly, a New York court rejected the argument that a defendant
was only conveying historical information when an apparel manufacturer
made a jersey imprinted with the photo of the team members of the
famous 1969 New York Mets World Series Champions baseball team.47
The court held that this use of personal identity on an item of apparel
was a violation of the New York statutory right of publicity.4 8 Thus, re-
gardless of the defendant's motivation for including the photo along with
baseball historical information, "the fact remains that [defendant] is at-
tempting to cash in on plaintiffs' skill and renown on the baseball dia-
mond. Without plaintiffs' consent, that is something defendant simply
cannot do."4 9
D. Sports Trading Cards: The Cardtoons Case
Another issue concerns sports trading cards similar to those in the
seminal Haelan case. The question is whether trading cards are commu-
nicative - like stories in Sports Illustrated, or commercial - like the use of
a ball player's name on a model of sports shoe or baseball bat.
In the 1996 Cardtoons case, the Tenth Circuit applied Oklahoma law
and balanced the right of publicity against a First Amendment defense."0
In doing this, the court dismissed a right of publicity claim against a com-
pany that made baseball cards that parodied prominent professional
45. Id. at 416.
46. Id.
47. Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
48. Id. at 935-36.
49. Id. at 937.
50. Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
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baseball players." The court found that the parody baseball trading
cards were not commercial speech, but were to be classified so as to
receive "full First Amendment protection."52 The court said that in or-
der to adequately poke fun at the plaintiffs, defendant had no feasible
alternative other than to use plaintiffs' identities and to use the baseball
trading card format to do So. 3 The court concluded that parody trading
cards "are not commercial speech - they do not merely advertise another
unrelated product. 54
E. California: The Three Stooges and T-Shirts
Soon a decision will come out of the California Supreme Court that
will add to this discussion. The court has been sitting for almost two
years on a case that will determine if unauthorized use of a person's
identity on a T-shirt is protected by the First Amendment. Defendant
artist drew a sketch of the Three Stooges and sold prints and T-shirts
with the sketch on it. The owner of the post mortem right of publicity of
the Three Stooges obtained an injunction, defendant's profits of
$75,000.00 and attorney fees.55 Defendant argued that the First Amend-
ment immunized this use because a T-shirt is a "communicative" me-
dium of expression. 6 The court rejected this, noting that neither
defendant's T-shirts nor its prints conveyed any "message" other than a
picture of the Three Stooges. 7 Similarly, the court rejected the defense
that this was "art" and therefore immune. 8 In March 1999, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court granted a hearing. 9
F. The Tiger Woods Painting
A last example comes from the Tiger Woods case. On summary
judgement, the federal court in Ohio dismissed Woods' claim that his
right of publicity under Ohio law had been infringed by defendant's use
51. Id.
52. Id. at 970.
53. Id. at 971-72.
54. Id. at 970.
55. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 4th 744 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998).
56. Id. at 751-53.
57. Id. at 752.
58. Id. at 753.
59. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 973 P.2d 512 (Cal. 1999).
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of Woods' likeness in prints of defendant's painting of Tiger Woods in
action on the golf course.6"
The court found that such an unauthorized use of the image of a
famous athlete was protected by principles of free artistic expression be-
cause "paintings and drawings are protected by the First Amendment." 61
The fact that the painting was reproduced and sold in an edition of 5,000
prints was found not to convert the artistic image into a commercial
product. Instead, the court stated that "the print at issue herein is an
artistic creation seeking to express a message. The fact that it is sold is
irrelevant to the determination of whether it receives First Amendment
protection." 62
III. FALSE ENDORSEMENT AND LANHAM Acr § 43(A)
A Lanham Act § 43(a) false endorsement claim is often the compan-
ion of a right of publicity claim.63 As indicated in the prior Clint East-
wood and Jerry Rice examples, not all uses of a person's identity to help
sell goods or services will contain a message of endorsement. However,
if it does, there are a number of § 43(a) cases that find false endorse-
ment. For example, the Ninth Circuit puts false endorsement claims in
the trademark prong of the statute, saying that the celebrity's identity is
like a trademark.'
Another issue is whether the use of the identity of a deceased athlete
triggers a Lanham Act § 43(a) false endorsement. In other words, would
consumers who know that Joe DiMaggio is deceased possibly think that
an ad for computer software featuring a photo of "Jolting Joe" doffing
his cap to the crowd was endorsed by DiMaggio? Alternatively, would
consumers think that it was endorsed after his death by his estate? Re-
member that for years, Joe DiMaggio did endorse Mr. Coffee brand cof-
fee makers.65
60. ETW Corp. v Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (presently on
appeal).
61. Id. at 835.
62. Id. at 836.
63. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
64. Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d 407; McCARmHY, supra note 12, at § 5:30.
65. In 2000, a dispute arose over the plan of the City of San Francisco to name the North
Beach playground the "Joe DiMaggio Playground," in honor of the great baseball player, who
was raised in San Francisco and, when growing up, played baseball on that playground. The
Florida executor of DiMaggio's estate objected that this playground was not exalted enough
to bear the DiMaggio name and threatened to obtain an injunction to stop it. The City argued
that this was not a commercial use that would trigger the California post mortem right of
publicity statute. E. Epstein, S.F. Defies DiMaggio Executor: North Beach Playground To Be
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In the recent Princess Diana case, the executors of the estate of Di-
ana, the late Princess of Wales, and the exclusive licensee of commercial
rights, sued the Franklin Mint maker of various items of unauthorized
Princess Diana merchandise such as a Franklin Mint Diana doll.66 Judge
Paez dismissed the right of publicity claims and the decision was subse-
quently affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.
The claim for infringement of Diana's post mortem right of publicity
under the California post-mortem statute was also dismissed. 67 Using
rules of conflict of laws, the court found that the law of the place of the
decedent's domicile, in this case Great Britain, should control.6" Since
Great Britain recognizes neither privacy rights, nor rights of publicity,
the claim had to be dismissed.69
This left the Lanham Act § 43(a) false endorsement claim; Judge
Cooper in Los Angeles dismissed the false endorsement claim on sum-
mary judgment.70 Judge Cooper found that the most important factor
arguing against false endorsement by the estate was the extensive unau-
thorized use of the name and image of Princess Diana on commercial
articles, both before and after her death.71 This weakened trademark-
like rights in her name and image to the point that "her image has truly
lost any significance as a mark identifying the source of a product."'72
Defendant argued that no consumer would reasonably believe that
its products derived from or were authored by Princess Diana, her estate
Named For Yankee Great, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 11, 2000, at Al. A lawsuit filed by the DiMaggio
estate in Florida was dismissed.
Eventually, the dispute was settled and the playground was renamed the "Joe DiMaggio
Playground." E. Epstein, Accord Reached In Dispute Over DiMaggio Name: SF Free to
Rename Playground, S. F. CHRON., Oct. 10, 2000, at A17.
66. Lord Simon Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd
unpublished Op. Diana Princess of Wales Mem'l Fund v. Franklin Mint Co., 216 F.3d 1082
(9th Cir. 1999). On remand, the court held that a recent legislative amendment to the Califor-
nia right of publicity statute was not a choice of law provision and did not change the result in
the Princess Diana case. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 880 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
("There is no doubt that the initial drafts of the proposed statute contained a choice-of-law
provision that, if enacted, would have overturned this Court's decision in Cairns .... The
nature of the legislative process inevitably results in compromise. It is clear from a review of
the legislative history here, that the choice-of-law provision in an early version of the pro-
posed statute fell victim to such a compromise and was never enacted.").
67. Lord Simon Cairns, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1029.
68. Id. at 1026-28.
69. Id. at 1026-29.
70. Lord Simon Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
71. Id. at 1217.
72. Id.
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or the exclusive licensee.7 3 Can the use of the identity of a deceased
person ever trigger a Lanham Act § 43(a) false endorsement claim?
While not closing the door to all such claims, this opinion comes close to
such an absolute rule. Judge Cooper referred to the unchallenged Andy
Warhol paintings of Campbell Soup cans and Marilyn Monroe.
The court appeared to say that the use of the name and image of a
deceased celebrity on jewelry, plates and dolls is not a use that conveys a
message of endorsement by the estate of the deceased.74
IV. CYBERSQUATTING OF PERSONAL NAMEs
The Internet is another area where recent legislation has been passed
that may deal with the right of publicity. In 1999, Congress added provi-
sions to the federal anti-cybersquatting amendments providing for pro-
tection against the use of non-trademarked personal names by
cybersquatters.7 5 Cynics say that the personal names part of the Act was
tacked on and passed because several Senators were mad about critics
and political opponents who reserved the Senators' names as domain
names. However, Congress has stated that these provisions are limited
and are only directed at a very specific type of cybersquatting.76
In the legislation, Congress did not specify where in the United
States Code these provisions should be codified. Thus, the legislation is
not a part of the Lanham Act. The people whose job it is to codify the
enactments of Congress have determined that it should appear in the
code as 15 U.S.C.A. § 1129. That is right after the end of the Lanham
Act.
The act creates civil liability for the cybersquatting of a personal
name, requiring the plaintiff to plead and prove four elements:
(1) The defendant has registered a domain name;
(2) Which consists of or is confusingly similar to the name of the
plaintiff, who is a living person;
(3) Without the plaintiff's consent;
73. Id. at 1218-20.
74. Id. at 1216, 1220.
75. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and addi-
tional provisions in 15 U.S.C. § 1129 (2000). See also McCARTHY, supra note 40, at § 25:80.
76. 145 CONG. REc. S14715 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999) (Senate Section-by-Section Analy-
sis) ("In sum, this subsection is a narrow provision intended to curtail one form of "cyber-
squatting"-the act of registering someone else's name as a domain name for the purpose of
demanding remuneration from the person in exchange for the domain name. Neither this
section nor any other section in this bill is intended to create a right of publicity of any kind
with respect to domain names. Nor is it intended to create any new property rights, intellec-
tual or otherwise, in a domain name that is the name of a person.").
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(4) The defendant has committed the acts with a specific intent to
profit from the plaintiff's name by selling the domain name
for financial gain to the plaintiff or any third party.77
Two other factors are very important.
(1) Names protected: The Senate explanation of the bill stated that it
covers full names (e.g. <johndoe.com>), surnames (e.g. <doe.com>) and
variations such as <john-doe.com> or <jondoe.com>. 7 Congress did not
state whether it intended "name" to include pen names, stage names or
widely recognized nicknames. (e.g. <chersite.com>).
(2) Intent to profit from the plaintiffs name. The statute requires that
the defendant have a specific intent to profit from the name of another
living person.79 In the author's opinion, this must mean that the re-
quired intent must be to profit from the name as a name specifically
identifying the plaintiff. For example, many famous people share a first
and last name with many other persons. A person who does not have
that name but registers the name with the intent to sell it to that famous
person is the intended target of this legislation.
California has its own flavor of anti-cyberpiracy laws covering per-
sonal names. On August 21, 2000, the governor signed into law Califor-
nia Business & Professions Code § 17525, a California style Anti-
Cybersquatting Act.80 The California law is very similar, but not identi-
cal to, the federal anti-cybersquatting provisions protecting personal
names. Senator Burton, the sponsor of the law, said that he introduced
this legislation because he thought the federal act was "flawed" and he
wanted to close gaps he perceived in the federal ACPA legislation.8'
The legislation passed without a dissenting vote in the California
legislature.
The California act includes the name of a "deceased personality,"
whereas the federal act is limited to the name of a "living person."'
"Deceased personality" is defined as encompassing those persons whose
identities are protected under the California post-mortem right of pub-
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (2000).
78. 145 CONG. REc. S14715 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1999) (Senate Section-by-Section
Analysis).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A).
80. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17525 (2001).
81. California Senate Floor Analysis of SB 1319, at 9 (Aug. 4, 2000) (quoting Senator
Burton, the author of the bill). See also Lynda Gledhill, New Law On Cyber Piracy, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 23, 2000, at D1 (a news report remarked that the new law "closes a gap" in the
federal law).
82. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17525 (2001); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2000).
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licity statute: Civil Code § 3344.1.83 This statute creates a post mortem
right of publicity lasting for seventy years after death.84
V. CONCLUSION
This essay has sketched the general contours of the state of the law
today as to the right of publicity, emphasizing the sports dimension. It
also discussed the related area of false endorsement, noting the difficulty
of bringing such a claim on behalf of a deceased personality. The third
point covered was the new federal and California laws on cybersquatting
of personal names.
Clearly, there has always been a tension between the legitimate free
speech rights of sports commentators and writers on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, the rights of athletes not to have their identities used
without permission to help sell goods and services. The courts in the
future will have to sort out many difficult issues arising at the borderline
between free speech and the right of publicity.
83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (2000).
84. Id.
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